Gironde wildfire aftermath spurs forest fire prevention debate

Questions grow over prevention, resources and forest safety

France's water bombing Canadair fleet is set to grow from 12 to 16 by 2032
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A long-standing debate over how France should best fight forest fires and whether more money should go into prevention has flared up again after Gironde’s worst blaze since 1949.

The argument resurfaces after nearly every major blaze.

Its most persistent voice was Haroun Tazieff, a volcanologist appointed by François Mitterrand as France’s first commissioner, then secretary of state, for prevention of major natural risks, holding the roles from 1981 to 1986.

He repeatedly argued that once a blaze reaches megafire scale under extreme wind, heat and drought, fire-fighting crews and water-bombers become far less effective.

Money is better spent stopping fires reaching that scale in the first place, he said, through brush-clearing, firebreaks, forest maintenance and stricter rules on building in at-risk woodland.

In 1982, he persuaded the government to fund brush-cutting machinery for regions willing to draw up their own clearance plans and he repeated the same argument through the fire seasons of 1984, 1985 and 1986, each time pointing to underfunded prevention rather than a shortage of fire-fighting hardware. His critics said he underestimated genuine advances in fire-fighting technique and risked discouraging intervention.

Mr Tazieff also argued that media pressure after big fires pushed politicians towards announcing new aircraft and equipment, rather than committing to less visible, longer-term prevention.

He said entrenched institutional and political interests favoured ever-larger fire-fighting budgets over sustained investment in forest management.

Decades on, most specialists describe the two arguments as complementary, rather than competing: prevention determines whether a fire becomes a megafire, but fast, coordinated intervention remains essential for catching new fires early.

That balance, and whether France still gets it right, is exactly the question Gironde has revived.

How the Gironde fire began

The blaze began on July 22 near Saumos, a commune bordering Le Porge. Contractors were carrying out brush-cutting near power lines for electricity network operator Enedis when a fire broke out nearby.

Sparks from the tractor-mounted cutter are suspected but not confirmed as the cause. The Bordeaux prosecutor has said the fire appears to have started at the worksite, while stressing investigators have found no breach of safety regulations.

By that evening, members of the local association syndicale autorisée for the defence of forests against fire (DFCI), a volunteer body made up largely of people who work in or own the pine forests, were recommending that a firebreak be burnt ahead of the flames.

DFCI members can assist fire-fighting operations under the legal framework governing their associations, but once the fire brigade takes command, they must follow its operational structure.

According to residents, the incident commander declined to authorise the burn. An attempt was made around midnight, but by then the main fire was too intense and the flames jumped it.

Some reports describe a more heated exchange between DFCI members and the incident commander that evening, including a threat to remove DFCI members from the site.

Claims over fire-fighting resources

A separate and more contested claim has also circulated: that fire-fighting resources were pulled away from Le Porge to protect the wealthier, more tourist-heavy Cap Ferret peninsula.

Marc Vermeulen, director of the Gironde fire and rescue service (Sdis 33), has publicly rejected this, saying the resources that moved toward Cap Ferret and Lège were doctors, fuel trucks and medical support, not fire-fighting engines, and no fire-fighting equipment was diverted.

He pointed out that Cap Ferret’s evacuation, covering some 40,000 people on a peninsula with a single access road, was a different scale of problem to that facing Le Porge’s roughly 3,500 residents.

Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu visited Le Porge twice after the fire.

Among measures he promised was help with insurance claims, including naming providers who failed to meet their responsibilities.

Wildfires are not generally covered by France’s catastrophe naturelle insurance.

They fall instead under the ordinary garantie incendie in every multi-risk home insurance policy – although exceptions exist.

Human causes and brush-clearing rules

Government data for 2024 shows that where the cause of wildfires can be identified, only 12% were natural, while 88% were human-related, including 31% that were arson/criminal.

The fire has renewed a long-standing clash between fire-prevention rules and environmental protection.

Current débroussaillement rules generally require vegetation clearance within 50 metres of buildings in at-risk communes, even where it extends on to neighbouring land.

These obligations sit uneasily alongside environmental protections for nesting species, a tension sharpened by a Conseil d’Etat ruling in February limiting brush-clearance during nesting season.

David Lisnard, president of the Association des maires de France, summed up the contradiction after visiting fire-hit Pontevès in Var: the forestry code requires brush clearance while the environmental code limits it in the name of protected species.

He has insisted there is no real conflict between protecting nature and protecting people: “The enemy of nature is neither the firebreak, nor brush-clearing, nor water reserves.

“The enemy is fire. It’s fire that destroys ecosystems, devastates landscapes and produces fine particles and carbon monoxide.”

Mr Lisnard has also pointed to enforcement failures: 90% of homes destroyed in recent fires stood on poorly-cleared land, yet the theoretical €50-per-square-metre fine for non-compliance is rarely enforced.

He suggested insurers could help close the gap by tying premiums and deductibles to compliance.

Scale of the Gironde blaze

The blaze ultimately burned around 420km² across Gironde, one of the largest fires to hit the region since the catastrophic 1949 Landes/Gironde fire, in which 82 people died, including a local mayor. He was trapped along with around 20 fire-fighters and several volunteers when the wind changed.

This year’s fire destroyed some 240 homes in total, 183 of them in Le Porge.

More than 220,000 people were evacuated, with smoke visible as far as 60km away. No one died but more than 330 fire-fighters were injured by the time the blaze was brought fully under control.

What comes next?

The interior ministry, responding to criticism during the fire, detailed the aerial resources deployed: 12 Canadair water bombers, eight Dash aircraft, six Air Tractor planes, and 12 water-bombing helicopters, supplemented by aircraft made available under the EU’s civil-protection arrangements.

Two DHC-515 aircraft ordered in 2024 with EU support are due in 2028, and the government ordered two more in June at a cost of nearly €200million, with the Sécurité civile fleet set to grow from 12 to 16 Canadairs by 2032.

That expansion sits squarely on the intervention side of the ledger that Mr Tazieff argued, more than 40 years ago, was already over-favoured.

Whether the money spent after Gironde tilts meaningfully toward the prevention he championed, or simply buys more of the hardware he warned against relying on, is likely to be the real test of whether this debate has moved on.