France’s proposed voluntary national service: military revival or costly misstep?

Concerns have emerged over scheme's potential overlap with the recently abandoned Service national universel

Military parade on the Champs-Elysées
The Ministry of the Armed Forces also sees it as a way to strengthen France’s defence readiness and expand the pool of potential reservists
Published

Plans to reintroduce a new form of national military service in France, this time voluntary, have been met with mixed reactions. 

President Emmanuel Macron announced the initiative on November 27 during a speech at a military base in Varces (Isère). The programme aims to revive the connection between the armed forces and young people amid rising international tensions. 

President Macron said the scheme will “strengthen the pact between nation and army” in the face of “accelerating threats” on the global stage.

Supporters argue the change offers young people a structured opportunity to develop discipline, gain new skills, and participate in a meaningful national project. 

The Ministry of the Armed Forces also sees it as a way to strengthen France’s defence readiness and expand the pool of potential reservists, particularly at a time when many European nations are reassessing military resilience.

Yet the programme has already sparked debate. Concerns have emerged over its potential overlap with the recently abandoned Service national universel (SNU), a civilian national service initiative launched in 2019 to promote social cohesion and youth engagement. 

It was gradually scaled back due to low participation, high costs, and administrative challenges.

For Hubert Pénicaud, national representative for community life at France Bénévolat (France Volunteering), however, the new initiative is fundamentally – and worryingly – different.

“First of all, this is indeed military service […] the purpose is defence, as part of a ‘new army model’. It is aimed at creating a new force, connected to the active army and drawn from youth. 

“This is not therefore an evolution of the SNU; it is something else entirely, with nothing to do with the objectives of the SNU: social cohesion, civic engagement etc.”

Mr Pénicaud also expressed concern over the naming of the new programme, which is to be called simply ‘national service’. 

“For clarity, the name should make the intention clear: this is military service.”

He warned that civil society should remain vigilant to ensure youth engagement is not limited to a military scope “both in government messaging (‘Get involved’) and in the allocation of resources, which could be to the detriment of civic service, voluntary association work, and other forms of volunteering, all already under pressure from public authorities.”

Read more: mandatory militarised civic service for youths in France aged 16-25 starts this autumn

Critics have also raised questions about the programme’s financial feasibility. 

Implementing the initiative is projected to cost around €2billion in its first year alone, prompting questions about whether the investment will match its intended outcomes, especially if volunteer numbers remain limited.

In addition, there are concerns that it may disproportionately attract young people from disadvantaged backgrounds while failing to foster genuine national cohesion. 

Vincenzo Bove, professor of Economics at the IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, in Italy, and co-author of ‘Military Culture and Institutional Trust: Evidence from Conscription Reforms in Europe’ (2022), says that lessons from past conscription systems are relevant. 

“Empirical evidence shows that conscription very often does not offer the broad societal benefits often attributed to it.

“Short periods of mandatory service do not produce militarily useful skills for modern armed forces and entail substantial economic costs for young people, including lower lifetime earnings and delays in education.”

Mr Bove adds that evidence of civic or social gains is “very weak,” despite conscription often being promoted as a tool to foster national unity or democratic engagement. 

His research finds “no positive effects on civic engagement or trust in democratic institutions” and, in some cases, service appears to reduce trust. He warns that voluntary schemes may face similar limitations. 

On the economic side, he says: “Mandatory service reduces young people’s lifetime earnings, interrupts human-capital accumulation, lowers the probability of university completion, and can reduce long-term productivity.” 

For governments, too, rewards can be elusive: “The economic return on conscription is consistently low relative to its fiscal and social costs,” he says, emphasising that such realities should be considered when evaluating a voluntary national service.

Stronger opposition has come from CRAJEP Hauts-de-France, the regional network of youth and popular-education associations.

It rejects what it calls the “militarisation of youth” and calls for a genuine policy of education for peace. 

“We cannot instill fear in an entire nation or send new generations into existential anxiety based on war and death,” the group said in a press release. 

CRAJEP emphasises that young people should not be treated as cannon fodder and warns that reverting to military-style programs represents a major political shift requiring a transparent, informed democratic debate.

The association advocates education based on peace, cooperation, and non-violent conflict resolution. 

“We support voluntary civic engagement programs that are empowering and based on social utility, solidarity, ecological transition, the fight against inequality, and the strengthening of social bonds.”

It has called for a broad national debate involving youth associations, trade unions, researchers, and local authorities to develop an engagement policy that serves society without imposing a martial framework. 

“Youth deserve a horizon of peace, not military training,” it said.

The new scheme arrives at a delicate moment: public finances are strained, France’s security landscape is evolving, and trust in institutions is fragile. 

Whether it becomes a meaningful tool for youth engagement and defence readiness, or ends as a costly symbolic gesture, will depend on participation levels, quality of training, and the government’s ability to integrate volunteers into reserve structures.

As the first cohort approaches, civil-society organisations, youth groups, academics, and defence specialists will continue to scrutinise the programme, testing not only its military value but its promise as a tool for civic engagement and social cohesion in modern France.